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ABSTRACT
INVESTIGATING INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY CHARACTERISTICS: DO
QUALITY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE REDUCE ORGANIZATIONAL
FRAUD?
By
Dennis T. Brown
Organizational fraud, a deceitful practice or willful device resorted to with intent
to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do harm or injury, is a growing
global concern. While cyberattacks from the outside are more expected, the internal
security threat from trusted insiders is responsible for significantly more information
compromise than external threats. Information systems make life easier but are
increasingly used by employees to perpetrate fraudulent activities. For example, a trusted
insider employee with access to sensitive customer databases could misappropriate
information and sell it to a competitor for personal gain. These type losses are typical of
organizational fraud averaging 5% of annual revenues, and current detection and
prevention methods are not fully adequate to address the threat.
This research examines how organizational fraud is affected by information
security policy characteristics. We specifically study the effects of quality and
enforcement as mediated by security compliance using a sampling of survey data from
selected organizations. Our results show that increased quality and enforcement supports
increased compliance. We found an inverse relationship between policy compliance and
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organizational fraud. Additionally, our model demonstrates that compliance fully
mediates between policy quality, policy enforcement, and the dependent variable fraud.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Organizational fraud reduces every organization’s ability to reach its full
potential. It is a major insidious risk facing businesses and is increasingly difficult to
detect and prevent (Abbasi, Albrecht, Vance, & Hansen, 2012; Cressey, 1986; Wolfe &
Hermanson, 2004). Fraud is a latent crime; its true, complete impact is difficult to
measure accurately (Button, Lewis, Shepherd, & Brooks, 2015; Davis & Pesch, 2013).
Fraud affects society to such a degree that it has effectively reduced overall consumer and
investor confidence in core business processes (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2008).
Computers make handling, storage and manipulation of large amounts of data much
easier but have also introduced greater opportunity for organizational fraud. Wider use of
information systems has opened the door to opportunistic, self-serving behavior,
including fraud. Information security policy violations result in a “superhighway” to
various organizational fraud activities (Trinkle, Crossler, & Warkentin, 2014; Willison &
Warkentin, 2013). The purpose of this research is to examine how organizational fraud is
affected by information security policy characteristics of quality, enforcement, and
compliance. Significant variance has been explained in previous individual studies to
predict compliance, but not in the context of fraud research. We specifically study the
effects of quality and enforcement as mediated by security compliance using a sampling
of survey data from selected individuals. A review of 29 quantitative studies revealed 61
antecedent variables that determine information security policy compliance. Since there
are so many potential independent variables that explain only a small portion of the
1
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variation, we chose to narrow the focus to those that potentially explain relatively
more, especially those with a hypothesized interaction effect (policy quality and
enforcement). Also, many of the studies using other variables present either conflicting
results or a wide statistical range of similar results. For example, the predictor variable
“subjective norm” ranged from a β = -0.09 to 0.45 (Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, &
Bengtsson, 2014). We chose to use the independent variables of policy quality and
enforcement because policy quality coupled with robust enforcement are variables that
directly impact the human aspect of the insider threat, which is generally considered more
dangerous and potentially harmful than attacks from outside sources. Trusted individuals
working inside organizations continue to be the weakest link when assessing overall
security risk (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010b; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen,
2012; M. Siponen & Willison, 2009). Several elements of enforcement, including
perceived behavioral control, perceived justice of punishment, threat appraisal, and the
threat of sanctions (certainty, celerity, and severity) most significantly predicted
compliance (Sommestad et al., 2014). The following sections focus on organizational
fraud and the theoretical relationships between each of the specified information security
policy characteristics (quality, enforcement, and compliance) included in this research
study.
Organizational Fraud
Organizational fraud is defined here as “some deceitful practice or willful device,
resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an
injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional” (Bryan,
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2009). This is consistent with the accounting and auditing community definition set forth
in the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 99 (T. D. Carpenter, 2007).
Most of the current fraud detection/prevention models focus on financial
measures (generally 6-10) and ratios, which work to identify and disclose certain “red
flags” or other indicators of potential fraud (Abbasi et al., 2012). Our model differs
significantly since we focus on antecedents that impact actions of the trusted insiders in
general before they have a chance to act. These trusted insiders generally have the ability
to inflict the most harm acting from within the organization.
There are several different types of fraud schemes discussed in the literature.
Asset misappropriation is one such example in which a perpetrator steals, abuses or
otherwise misuse the employing organization’s resources. An example of these resources
is the customer database, which contains sensitive, proprietary information critical to
successful operations of the business. Customer databases are among many
organizations’ most valuable non-monetary assets and are a significant target of insider
fraud attempts. Professional data collected and retained for business purposes poses a
threat due to its very existence (Rechtman & Rashbaum, 2015). As data volume grows,
organizations are increasingly targets for unauthorized use (Rechtman & Rashbaum,
2015). For example, trusted insiders may feel emboldened to violate existing security
policies to steal valuable database information and use it for personal gain (DeZoort &
Harrison, 2016).
Although external audits are a popular fraud tool, they are empirically among the
least effective (ACFE, 2016). Despite changes to basic accounting and internal control
procedures following the scandals at Enron, WorldCom and others, the problem
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continues to worsen (Abbasi et al., 2012). Only a small portion of white-collar crimes and
misdemeanors are discovered, including computer-related employee fraud in the
workplace (Lowe, Pope, & Samuels, 2015; Straub Jr & Nance, 1990).
Information Security Policy Compliance
Extant research has not studied potential synergistic effects of policy quality and
enforcement thus far. Since the main threat to information security originates with trusted
employees’ non-compliance with security policies, we searched for independent variables
that theoretically explain more of the reasons for this lack of compliance (M. Siponen,
Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014). Non-compliance of information security policy and weak
internal controls may be linked to fraudulent activity of various types (Lynch & Gomaa,
2003; Richardson & Director, 2008). Lack of policy compliance is a recognized
weakness in most organizations and is increasingly becoming a management and
leadership priority (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Coopers, 2014; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett,
2015). According to Whitman (2003), human failures and insufficient security policies
ranked number three and four respectively among information security threats in order of
severity (Whitman, 2003). Insider employees that leave the organization become a
special threat; 59% admit to stealing privileged client information such as customer
contact lists, employee records, and various forms of non-financial data contact lists
(Ayyagari, 2012).
Information Security Policy Quality
Information security policy quality is the perceived level of adequacy and
completeness of the guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an
organization (Chen et al., 2012; Goo, Yim, & Kim, 2014). Past research and General
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Deterrence Theory (GDT) theoretically link information security policy quality and
enforcement to information security policy compliance (Goo et al., 2014); however, any
potential relationship between information security policy quality leading to compliance
and fraud has not been studied.
The insider threat is generally considered to have more harmful potential than
attacks from outside sources (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Chen et al., 2012; M. Siponen &
Willison, 2009). Fraud is more difficult to accomplish from the outside since the
perpetrator does not know where the information resides and has to search through large
amounts of data. Research indicates that security policies focusing on the insider versus
external threats are more successful in preventing information losses (Posey, Roberts,
Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013). Fraud surveys find that 51% of those responding
have no plan in place to deal with insider threats despite the upward trend. Many
companies still do not have a formal information systems threat security function and
simply let the IT section handle issues (Coopers, 2014). Since computers and large
volumes of data contained in information systems are common to most industries, many
opportunities for fraud and other malicious activity are increasingly available to potential
perpetrators (Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; Purda & Skillicorn, 2015).
Higher information quality contained in the information security policy positively
affects end-user information security policy compliance (Abedin, Nessa, Al-Shaer, &
Khan, 2006; Bulgurcu et al., 2010b). Effective policy forms the underlying basis for all
subsequent security efforts, including security culture and enforcement (Chen et al.,
2012; Lindup, 1995; M. Siponen & Vance, 2010). Employees must understand clearly the
limits of their computer system’s acceptable use. For example, unauthorized access to
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sensitive and proprietary data and subsequent file transfers offer multiple opportunities to
engage in fraud. Policy that limits employee access through internal controls removes the
basic opportunity to commit fraud. Limiting the number of authorized users essentially
reduces the potential for malevolent behaviors leading to fraud. (Lynch & Gomaa, 2003;
Roden, Cox, & Kim, 2016; Tabuena, 2013).
Many potential fraud events originate simply with an individual’s ability to
download sensitive information with little perceived monitoring or accountability
(opportunity). Weak institutional and/or individual pressure to comply with established
policy (lack of deterrence) results in perceived fraud opportunity. Higher quality
information security policies inhibit potentially malevolent activities. Quality information
security policies are designed to prohibit the unauthorized download of sensitive and
valuable proprietary information, including company trade secrets and intellectual
property. Higher quality security policies minimize the number of vetted employees
granted access to highly sensitive information based on a bona-fide job requirement and
“need-to-know”. Often this first line of defense is enough to prevent the opportunity to
commit fraud and serves as a preemptive deterrent. Effective security monitoring and
other forms of enforcement may create an environment where employees perceive they
lack the opportunity to perpetrate fraud without discovery and subsequent sanctions.
Organizational fraud concealment often involves manipulation of account values
to set up later theft of assets (Ngai, Hu, Wong, Chen, & Sun, 2011; Steinbart, Raschke,
Gal, & Dilla, 2015). If internal security controls are weak or not enforced in the
company, employees may perceive easy opportunities to perpetrate organizational fraud
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while remaining anonymous. This is especially true if there is a lack of strong
enforcement processes in place.
Information Security Policy Enforcement
Most violations are not caught by existing functional security risk management
(SRM) programs but instead are discovered by accident or though whistleblowers.
Information and tips from conscientious employees who witness fraud incidental to their
job performance are leading sources of initial fraud discovery in organizations (ACFE,
2016). This represents a low enforcement environment and indicates that other
established processes to detect fraud have failed (Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, & Pathak,
2010). If security policies are implemented effectively, most potential breaches will be
detected by a simple logging of violations tied to the fraudster. Employee attitudes
toward fraud and incident reporting form over time based on perceived and empirical
reinforcement in the workplace. Research indicates that only about 50% of employees
overall are willing to report potential acts of fraud (Kaplan, Pope, & Samuels, 2015).
These numbers could be significantly improved with increased policy quality and
enforcement (Goo et al., 2014; Liu, Wright, & Wu, 2015).
Many of the accounting and behavioral “Red Flags” associated with fraud are
linked to information security and policy compliance (G. M. Trompeter, Carpenter,
Jones, & Riley Jr, 2014). However, these policy violations and their possible specific
links to organizational fraud have not been studied significantly and require further
research (Tabuena, 2013).
Examples of typical policy violations include gambling, online social networks
(OSN) presence, day trading, gaming, pornographic sites, online dating, pyramid
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schemes, chain-letter e-mails, sports contests, jokes, lottery pools, cyber bullying, and
cyber stalking. Minimally these violations are considered pervasive forms of fraud and
result in lost employee productivity during work hours. These violations are also a
gateway to many more serious forms of potential fraud. Fraud could be significantly
reduced if employees would strictly adhere to official information security policies
(Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Organizational fraud in our study
focuses on data theft because of the ubiquitous nature of data in today’s “information
age”.
Organizations are concerned with the cost of security compromises, public image,
and increases in the volume of proprietary information requiring protection. Information
security developments offer the potential for significant inroads toward fraud reduction in
the future (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; M. Siponen et al., 2014; Willison & Warkentin, 2013).
Empirical research data linking fraud theory to fraud in a corporate environment is sparse
(Roden et al., 2016). Traditional studies of financial ratios to identify potential fraud have
demonstrated limited potential. We predicted that increased quality and enforcement
would result in synergistic compliance, thereby achieving the lowest level of fraud, which
was supported. Practitioners will benefit from empirical evidence that industry
investment in higher quality policy and enforcement increases compliance and reduces
perceived fraud.
Therefore, we propose following research question (RQ):
RQ: How is organizational fraud influenced by information security policy
characteristics?
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers existing
fraud and information security policy compliance literature and proposes hypotheses to
test the model. It also reviews previous efforts to identify and prevent financial fraud and
demonstrates the need for more effective and robust methods. Chapter 3 discusses the
methods used, study participants and setting, data analysis procedure and risks.
The subsequent sections discuss the findings, research limitations, and
recommended future research.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
Many reasons for organizational fraud are discussed in the literature, including
employee motivations, accessibility, organizational ethical climate, incentive,
opportunity, rationalization, and others (Ahmad & Norhashim, 2008; Albrecht, Howe, &
Romney, 1984; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; G. M. Trompeter et al., 2014). Many of these
antecedents are included in our independent variables (policy quality and enforcement).
Weak governance, lax audit controls, and inconsistent oversight all create perceived
opportunities for fraudsters to act and subsequently avoid detection and punishment
(Hafer & Gresham, 2012). The underlying basic concept of information security is that a
satisfactory policy coupled with adequate enforcement will result in an increased and
satisfactory level of security in the organization (Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, &
Bengtsson, 2014). Of the many variables introduced from years of study, enforcement
and policy quality were ranked as the most significant with the potential to explain more
of what past research failed to accomplish. Our objective for this research is to make a
unique contribution to the field of fraud identification and prevention by studying
antecedents that relate to the trusted human insider facet of policy compliance. Here we
narrow down the factors that will most explain policy enforcement. We study policy
characteristics and their relationship to fraud that potentially explain the most variance
and have not previously been studied.
Background
10

Cressey (Cressey, 1950, 1953) first studied fraud as a white-collar crime in the
modern era. Systematic causation was theorized to determine and predict “the criminal
violation of financial trust” among otherwise honorable employees and citizens (Cressey,
1950)(Cressey, 1950, p.740). Opportunity, incentive, and attitudes are key determinants
regarding individual propensity to commit fraudulent activity (Cressey, 1950, 1953,
1986; Sitorus & Scott, 2009).
Over the years, growth of computer use and the ubiquitous nature of information
databases increased the potential for more fraud opportunity. Congress passed the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in 1994 to prevent fraud using unauthorized
access to computers and associated data. The Act’s continued relevance is highlighted by
the fact that it has been amended and strengthened several times over the years. The first
amendment was 1994, again in 1996, then in 2002 following the events of 9/11 as part of
the USA Patriot Act. It was further updated in 2008 by the Identity Theft Enforcement
and Restitution Act. There is widespread disagreement between appellate courts
regarding the reach and limitations of the law, but so far all have been consistent in
application of the law regarding cases of intent to engage in fraudulent activities to obtain
anything of value (Thomason, 2013).
Congress also recognized the need and passed other key legislation designed to
strengthen security of information collected and stored by organizations. This served to
increase the awareness of top management and to increase their liability going forward.
Chief among these was the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act or Financial Modernization Act of
1999 (GLBA), which was designed to regulate how financial institutions handle, store
and safeguard information belonging to private citizens. The Act contains three sections
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designed to regulate the collection and dissemination of individuals’ private financial
information. It also mandates that financial institutions must develop and implement
information security programs to protect private information.
Opportunity is a key antecedent of fraud, and is theoretically more available to
trusted insiders (M. Siponen et al., 2014). Tenured employees occupying key positions
within organizations are trusted with greater access to a wider range and depth of
information, which also gives them commensurate opportunity to perform potentially
fraudulent activity (Albrecht et al., 2008; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). Long-term
employees and other trusted agents within the organization are often in positions to most
clearly understand and exploit existing security vulnerabilities using their authority
(Willison & Siponen, 2009). Information systems internal controls are designed to
prevent this self-serving, opportunistic behavior (Steinbart et al., 2015; Wolfe &
Hermanson, 2004). Many of them also develop the potential for nefarious individual gain
during years of observation and performance of their jobs. Opportunistic behavior is
increasingly likely when employees with significant capabilities and privileges are
allowed to operate without an effective and operational information security policy
(internal controls) in place (Albrecht, Wernz, & Williams, 1995; Wang, Gupta, & Rao,
2015).
Numerous methods of fraud detection and prevention have been studied to
address increasing trends of organizational fraud; current approaches and potential
solutions to fraud detection and prevention continue to fall short of expectations. (Abbasi
et al., 2012; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003). These methods include expanded traditional audits
(including more appropriate analytical procedures), automated approaches, data analytics,
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data visualization, meta-learning frameworks, data mining, and the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (Abbasi et al., 2012; Debreceny & Gray, 2010; Dilla & Raschke, 2015;
Ravisankar, Ravi, Rao, & Bose, 2011; G. Trompeter & Wright, 2010). More innovative,
robust and improved methods are required to stem rising losses (Abbasi et al., 2012;
Holton, 2009). Fraud cases average 18 months from execution to discovery, which
highlights the insidious nature of the problem (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,
2016). Most violations are not caught by existing functional security risk management
(SRM) programs but instead are discovered by accident or though whistleblowers,
thereby indicating weak enforcement (Cecchini et al., 2010; Straub Jr & Nance, 1990).
Information and tips from conscientious employees who witness fraud incidental to their
job performance are leading sources of initial fraud discovery in organizations (ACFE,
2016). Employee attitudes toward fraud and incident reporting form over time based on
perceived and empirical reinforcement in the workplace. Research indicates that only
about 50% of employees overall are willing to report potential acts of fraud (Kaplan et
al., 2015).
Information Security Policy Quality
Information security policy quality is the perceived level of adequacy and
completeness of the guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an
organization (Chen et al., 2012; Goo et al., 2014). Policy is a comprehensive collection of
rules, directives, and accepted practices that establish how an organization is to manage,
protect and distribute important, sensitive information (Swanson, Hash, & Bowen, 2006).
Information security policy design and implementation are important and poor quality
results in more security breaches (Tarafdar, DArcy, Turel, & Gupta, 2015; Whitman,
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2003). Top management involvement in policy formulation has a positive impact on
information security effectiveness, and management practices have a significant role in
information technology system effectiveness (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015;
Soomro, Shah, & Ahmed, 2016). Policy provides guidance and direction to systems users
and employees by specifically defining acceptable and unacceptable use of the
organization’s information systems and controlled information (Ashenden, 2008;
Flowerday & Tuyikeze, 2016).
Security policy is the foundation and arguably the most important security layer
available to organizations; it defines the security philosophy of the organization and is the
basis for future security decisions and priorities. It is also an indicator of the degree to
which the organization takes information security seriously (D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss,
2014; M. T. Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Whitman, 2003). These policies are the
subject of discussion, study, and disagreement regarding the content as they vary
significantly among organizations (Ølnes, 1994; Rees, Bandyopadhyay, & Spafford,
2003; Whitman, 2004; Wood, 1995).
Information security policy continues to evolve in order to meet emerging threats
(K. Höne & J. Eloff, 2002; K. Höne & J. H. P. Eloff, 2002; Lichtenstein, 1997; Ølnes,
1994; Rees et al., 2003; Wood, 1995). The most commonly used and accepted industry
guidelines are listed in Table 1. International information security standards originated to
promulgate “best practices” among quality organizations in order to ensure the proper
safeguarding of information in organizations (Susanto, Almunawar, & Tuan, 2012).
These standards are primarily technical in nature but should form the foundation for
comprehensive information security systems (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Susanto et
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al., 2012). Organizational policies must be individually tailored and strategically aligned
for consistency with the specific organizational goals and operating procedures of each
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Neil F Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Vroom & Von Solms,
2004). These key benchmarks allow organizations to measure their programs and policies
against industry standards, but they must still be modified for organizational and industry
variations (Susanto, Almunawar, Tuan, Aksoy, & Syam, 2011).
Table 1
Information Security Policy Quality Standards
Information Security Policy Quality

Studies/Reference

1. Industry Standards Factor

Price, Waterhouse, & Coopers, (2016)

2. ISO 27001/27002

International Standards Organization
(ISO), (2013).

3. Control Objectives for
Information and Related
Technology (COBIT) 5

ISACA, 2016

4. Cybersecurity Framework

U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), 2016.

5. British Standard 7799-3

British Standard Institution (BSI),
1995, 1998

6. Critical Security Controls
(SANS Top 20) version 6.0

SANS Institute, Council on
Cybersecurity (2013).

7. Information Technology
Infrastructure Library (ITIL)

British Standard Institution (BSI),
2011.

8. Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (PCIDSS)
v.3.2

Payment Card Industry Security
Standards Council, 2016.

Acceptable use policy (AUP) standards are critical to quality information security
policy since employees must completely understand their boundaries regarding
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workplace privileges and limitations in order to achieve compliance. It is impossible to
enforce standards if they are not quantified and codified (Neil Francis Doherty,
Anastasakis, & Fulford, 2011; Räisänen, 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Acceptable
use policy effectively reduces the opportunity of trusted insiders to be successful in
opportunistic and self-serving behavior. Acceptable use policy includes the seven
components contained in Table 2 (Neil Francis Doherty et al., 2011). For example, some
companies allow employees to pay bills from work and do other tasks not related to their
job within prescribed parameters during designated breaks. The exact same activity may
be strictly prohibited in other companies. Acceptable use policies serve as deterrence to
potential unauthorized behavior leading up to fraud. For example, if a policy prohibits
downloading sensitive proprietary information (such as customer information), then a
violation should immediately trigger a violation warning assuming that system
monitoring and electronic logging is functioning. By setting the boundaries for
employees, quality acceptable use policy affects employee attitudes as they consider
malicious activity and potential punishments for offending behavior (Bridges & Stone,
1986).
Policy must be written, communicated, enforced and institutionalized in order to
be effective (Kadam, 2007; Rees et al., 2003; Wood, 1995). Employees must initially and
periodically sign various instruments indicating their understanding and willingness to
comply with the established policy (enforcement). They must also understand that
progressive disciplinary action and/or sanctions for potential policy violations will be
levied quickly and surely. Recurrent employee refresher, acknowledgement and
understanding of the established policy at periodic intervals affects employee attitudes
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toward compliance and their expectations regarding future performance. It also ensures
that everyone, from the top down, is adhering to the same standards (Neil Francis
Doherty et al., 2011).
Table 2
Seven Components of Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
Components
1. Continuous monitoring of proprietary organizational assets with
activity logging.
2. Establishing a standard of “no privacy” expectations among employees
(complete opposite of anonymity).
3. Clear definition of boundaries regarding improper employee use of
computing assets.
4. Allowable employee uses and activities of computing assets.
5. Protection and security of sensitive company information.
6. Disciplinary action and sanctions for potential policy violations and
disclosure.
7. Written employee acknowledgement and understanding of the policy
Asset misappropriations are the most common form of fraud, occurring in 85% of
ACFE studies. Asset misappropriations are defined as fraud schemes where the
perpetrator steals, abuses or otherwise misuse the employing organization’s resources.
Common asset misappropriations include theft of company cash, valuables, or other noncash items, false billing schemes, and false or inflated expense reports (ACFE, 2016).
The top three most important contributing factors to fraud are 1) lack of internal
controls; 2) lack of management review; and 3) override of existing internal controls
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016). This is consistent with information
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systems literature which asserts that the most pressing threat to organizations is from
trusted insiders (Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Richardson & Director, 2008; G.
M. Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, & Riley Jr, 2012). Many of the most expensive
and damaging information security breaches have been from trusted managerial and
supervisory officials who by virtue of their duty position are exempt from adequate
scrutiny (Chen et al., 2012; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 2013). Since only a small fraction
of employees who discover fraud actually report it, other tools and controls must be
employed to ensure effective enforcement in organizations (Kaplan et al., 2015; Straub Jr
& Nance, 1990).
Information Security Policy Enforcement
Information security policy enforcement is the perceived level of supervisory
oversight, monitoring, and organizational emphasis placed on information security with
the goal of compliance (Goo et al., 2014). Organizational internal controls (policies and
monitoring) increase the level of compliance and reduce the incidence of employee
deviance, of which fraud is a key outcome (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley Jr,
2012; Hollinger & Clark, 1982). Effective information security policy enforcement is the
result of many factors, including human, physical and technological (Boss, Kirsch,
Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; Shropshire, Warkentin, & Sharma, 2015). Effective
enforcement requires employees to perceive that their supervisors monitor and care about
following established policies. It also requires that supervisors incorporate compliance
into overall performance assessments (Goo et al., 2014; Johnston et al., 2015). A
significant number of breaches could be prevented if victim organizations had simply
followed information systems internal controls (Corporation, 2016).
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Continuous monitoring of proprietary organizational assets is the most effective
when it is routine and standardized. All end-users should understand that every action on
the system is monitored, logged and retrievable for future use by management if
necessary for administrative and/or punitive actions; this establishes a degree of
accountability and eliminates the perception of anonymity. Previous research indicates
that anonymity is an inducement for potential perpetrators to engage in fraud since it
allows them to avoid identification (Vance et al., 2013). All employees should understand
that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any use of a companyprovided information technology system.
Internal control systems are designed to reduce employee and managers’
opportunity to carry out opportunistic and self-interested behavior (PCAOB, 2016). The
strength of these internal controls is a key factor regarding the efficacy of preventing the
undesired behavior (Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011). Policy quality and enforcement
determine the strength of internal information security controls leading to less
opportunity for potential fraudsters (Liu et al., 2015; Steinbart et al., 2015). Liu et al.
(2015) performed research regarding links between the strength of internal controls and
fraud. They found a significant correlation between weak monitoring and increased fraud
levels. As strength of monitoring decreases, organizational fraud levels increase (Liu et
al., 2015).
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Information Security Policy Compliance
Information security policy compliance is the degree to which employees intend
to comply with the rules set forth in the specific policy established by the company (Goo
et al., 2014). The main threat to information security originates with employee noncompliance with information security policies (M. Siponen et al., 2014). Compliance
with individual and organizational information security policies protects information
assets from various forms of malfeasance, many of which are antecedents to fraud.
Information assets are exploited for personal gain and are the object of various forms of
fraudulent activity (Lynch & Gomaa, 2003).
Individuals make security compliance decisions based on many factors, including
perceptions, beliefs, and biases (Chen et al., 2015; Q. Hu, West, & Smarandescu, 2015;
Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2015). Both negative and positive incentives
have been suggested and tested empirically to increase employee compliance with
established information security policy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Chen et al., 2012;
D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b). These incentives,
coupled with the perceived certainty, celerity and severity of sanctions to influence
employee behavior, have been extensively studied in the literature (Straub & Welke,
1998; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). However, the research findings do not indicate
strong support for these incentives as significantly affecting behavior, and do not always
agree (Chen et al., 2012). Findings also included a strong relationship between
information security policy, social controls and security culture, which suggests that
policy quality and enforcement are key attributes in achieving overall compliance with
organizational security objectives (Chen et al., 2015; Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry, 2015;
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Ifinedo, 2014). We reviewed many potential independent variables that explain smaller
amounts of the overall variance, many of which are antecedents comprising policy
quality and enforcement. For example, perceived risk of shame, perceived security risk,
security culture, and numerous others explained small amounts of variance. Our focus
here is to explain relatively more variance. Many past studies using other variables
produced varying and sometimes inconsistent results. We use policy quality and
enforcement because policy quality coupled with robust enforcement are variables that
directly impact the human aspect of the insider threat, which is generally considered more
dangerous and potentially harmful than attacks from outside sources.
Studies indicate that the perceived severity of information security threats resulted
in more behavioral intention to comply with information security policies (M. Siponen et
al., 2014). For example, as the perceived severity of the threat to the company increases,
so does the employees’ intention to comply. Employee belief as to whether they have the
ability to apply and adhere to information security policies (technical ability etc.) was
another significant factor. Similarly, employees’ perceived vulnerability to potential
security threats, their attitude toward complying with information security policies, and
organizational management modeling regarding compliance also affected intention to
comply (M. Siponen et al., 2014). Employee intention to comply with information
security policy is significantly influenced by attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy
to comply (Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015). Outcome beliefs significantly affect
attitudes regarding overall assessment of consequences, which in turn significantly
affects employee attitudes (Chen et al., 2012). Information security awareness positively
affects both attitude and outcome beliefs (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b).
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Recent research indicates that information system access policy violations result
in increased organizational fraud and theft. Although most information security policies
limit the use of computing systems strictly for company business, non-compliance by
employees is the weak link (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Use of computing systems for
other than company business is a gateway to other potentially malevolent behaviors
(Trinkle et al., 2014). These actions include a range of activity from simple surfing,
online social media visits, and ultimately fraud and cybercrime activities, all of which are
detrimental to the organization and against established information security policy
(Trinkle et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2015).
Additional studies investigating employees who violated information security
policies found most managers and senior executives are personally aware of someone
who has committed sabotage (Hafer & Gresham, 2012). One in five respondents reported
having been a victim, at least one-half know employees who have been victimized, and
one-third has personal knowledge of managers and customers who have been victimized.
A key finding is that one of the purposes of information sabotage is to commit fraud of
various types for personal gain (Hafer & Gresham, 2012).
General Deterrence Theory (GDT)
We selected General Deterrence Theory (Bridges & Stone, 1986; Maxwell &
Gray, 2000) as the theoretical framework for the proposed model and hypotheses.
General Deterrence Theory posits that sanctions, disincentives and the threat of
punishments or sanctions serve to discourage would-be violators from engaging in
prohibited behavior and supports policy compliance among employees. The perceived
probability of discovery coupled with the severity of the potential advertised sanctions or
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punishment increases, while the level of prohibited activity declines in a corresponding
manner (Straub & Welke, 1998). Internal controls, including policy enforcement, serve to
deter unethical behavior, and stronger controls correspondingly reduce the incidence of
fraud (Board, 2002; Liu et al., 2015).
General deterrence theory serves to explain and predict individual decisions
between compliance and non-compliance with established rules, policy, and law based on
perceived sanctions or penalties for non-compliance (Bridges & Stone, 1986; Maxwell &
Gray, 2000). Individuals make choices based on their internal assessment regarding the
potential benefits and costs of their decisions, and the perceived severity and certainty of
sanctions may influence individuals in their decisions to comply with security policies
(Bridges & Stone, 1986; Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013). Deterrence has predictive
ability for specific behaviors of criminal activity (Bridges & Stone, 1986), has been
successfully extended to the field of information systems (Chen et al., 2012; Nance &
Straub, 1988), serves as a potent deterrent to potential information security policy
violators, and leads to a significant decrease in violations (Straub Jr & Nance, 1990).
Past research was conducted to determine the effect that a threat of punishment or
sanctions has on the intended future behavior of individuals in various social,
organizational, business and contextual environments (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, &
Polak, 2015; Bridges & Stone, 1986; Erickson, Gibbs, & Jensen, 1977; Maxwell & Gray,
2000). Deterrence theory posits that sanctions, disincentives and the threat of
punishments or sanctions serve to discourage would-be violators from engaging in
prohibited behavior and supports policy compliance among employees. Also, as the level
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of certainty of being caught and severity of the sanction or punishment increases, the
level of prohibited activity declines in a corresponding manner.
A key determinant of deterrence effectiveness is clear and efficient
communication of the potential sanctions for violations and rewards for compliance,
including multiple clearly articulated statements, and follow-up regarding penalties for
violators (Chen et al., 2012; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Straub Jr & Nance, 1990).
Sanctions include various forms of penalties that the organization imposes on an
employee for noncompliance with the established information security policy. These may
range from a simple verbal warning to job termination and prosecution under criminal
statutes (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b).
The insider threat continues to be one of the most significant threats to
organizations (Tsohou et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2013; Willison & Siponen, 2009).
Recent studies extended the deterrence theory to investigate whether perceived certainty
and severity of organizational sanctions were affected by user awareness of information
security countermeasures. Computer users were found to be aware of security policies
through training programs and first-hand observation of computer misuse. Also the
perceived severity of sanctions was found to be more effective in reducing information
systems misuse than actual sanctions (D'Arcy et al., 2009).
Deterrence theory is especially applicable to information systems since 50-75% of
all security incidents originate from within the organization by employees and other
trusted agents having the access and ability to detect and carry out fraudulent activities
(D'Arcy et al., 2009). Studies are consistent in finding that a majority of the potential
violators are employees of the firm, and 59% of surveyed employees admit that they
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actually steal company data and use it for other than official purposes (Q. Hu, Dinev,
Hart, & Cooke, 2012). Early studies indicated that the presumptive certainty of the
punishment or sanction by the individual was more effective in deterring undesirable
behavior than was the severity (Erickson et al., 1977).
Additional research extended deterrence theory to investigate the effects of
perceived certainty and severity of organizational sanctions on user awareness of
information systems security countermeasures. They found that computer users were
aware of security policies through training programs and observation of computer misuse,
and that the perceived severity of sanctions was more effective in reducing information
systems misuse than actual sanctions (D'Arcy et al., 2009).
Since the top three most important contributing factors to fraud are lack of
internal controls, lack of management review and override of existing internal controls,
the human aspect must be considered. However, most academic and practitioner focus
has been on technical controls and financial ratios. The aim of this study is to explore the
variables the impact the human aspect more, i.e., policy quality and enforcement
activities (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016; Sommestad et al., 2014).
Research Model and Hypotheses
Figure 1 contains the proposed theoretical conceptual research model. Using the
theoretical framework of General Deterrence Theory, we will examine how information
security policy compliance mediates organizational fraud levels in a sampling of
individuals from various organizations.
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Four hypotheses will be tested. Table 3 contains the proposed theoretical
constructs and definitions.
Table 3
Theoretical Constructs and Definitions

Construct
Information
Security Policy
Enforcement

Definition
The level of supervisory oversight, monitoring and organizational
emphasis placed on information security (Goo et al., 2014).

Information
Security Policy
Quality

The perceived level of adequacy and completeness of the
guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an
organization (Goo et al, 2014; Chen Ramamurthy & Wen, 2015).

Information
Security Policy
Compliance

The degree to which employees actually adhere to rules set forth
in the specific policy established by the company.

Fraud

Some deceitful practice or willful device resorted to with intent to
deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an
injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive and
intentional (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2014; Lynch & Gomaa,
2003)

Hypotheses
One of the two main information security issues that businesses must focus on is the
protection of data, including proprietary information, employee information, marketing
plans, trade secrets, etc. (Dort & Criss). Employee abuse of computers and information
systems represents up to 75 percent of security incidents, thereby resulting in significant
loss to organizations through fraud and other malicious activities (D'Arcy et al., 2009).
Computer abuse includes employee noncompliance with computer security policies, and
fraud could be substantially reduced if employees would simply adhere to official
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organizational information security policies (Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin & Willison,
2009).
Figure 1
Conceptual Model

Information
Security
Policy
Enforcement

H1

Information
Security
Compliance

H3

H4

Organizational
Fraud

H2
Information
Security
Policy Quality

Quality security monitoring, as one element of strong enforcement, creates an
environment where employees perceive they cannot be successful in fraudulent activities.
Previous research established that organizational controls (policies and monitoring)
increase the level of compliance and reduce the incidence of employee deviance, of
which fraud is a key component (Dorminey et al., 2012; Hollinger & Clark, 1982).
Information technology is a powerful tool for monitoring and recording
workplace behavior, thereby establishing accountability (Vance et al., 2013). Comparing
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daily employee behavior to established standards by monitoring policy compliance
increases accountability and identifiability among employees. When employees perceive
their activities are recorded, a strong deterrence effect is created, thereby supporting a
reduction in antisocial behaviors (Vance et al., 2013). For example, if an employee
violates policy to access a customer database outside of their authority, the action would
be logged and quickly traced back to the potential fraudster. Monitoring and logging are
powerful deterrence tools and research supports their reduction in policy violations
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010b).
Policies must be adequately enforced and continuously checked for compliance in
order to accomplish intended objectives (Kaplan et al., 2015). Siponen and Vance (2010)
found that neutralization is a valid and reliable predictor of individual employee
compliance decisions regarding security policies. They conclude that neutralization
significantly and positively affects employee intention to violate information security
policies. Neutralization enables otherwise conscientious and exacting employees to
rationalize and justify violating organizational security policies, which may compromise
information and damage the company (M. Siponen & Vance, 2010).
Higher information systems security policy quality positively affects end-user
compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Goo et al., 2014). When employees feel that
significant effort and resources are invested in a security policy, its relevance and
enforcement are heightened (Abedin et al., 2006; Bulgurcu et al., 2010b). Internal
controls, including continuous monitoring and auditing tools provide strong deterrence
and enhance detection of potential fraud perpetrators (Dorminey et al., 2012).
Information security breaches enable bribery, embezzlement, espionage and sabotage
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opportunities, which accounts for a large percentage of organizational fraud activity (Safa
& Maple, 2016). Policy enforcement includes employee understanding of the penalties
for noncompliance, including their certainty, celerity, and severity. Greater emphasis on
these penalties by supervisors, role models, and peers results in a positive, significant
increase in compliance by organizational users (D'Arcy et al., 2009).
Trusted insider employees accumulate access privileges for proprietary databases
as their longevity and seniority increases during their tenure. Due to their trusted position
and access to increasingly sensitive organizational information, they are often in positions
to take advantage of systems and processes to commit fraud (B. W. Carpenter &
Mahoney, 2001; Posey et al., 2013). For example, a senior long-term employee who
perceives weak internal controls or lack of oversight may recognize the void in
accountability as a potential opportunity to engage in fraud. If the appropriate incentive
(pressure) is present and the employee is able to rationalize their actions as reasonable,
they may be positively influenced to perpetrate fraud. This is especially true if they
believe the potential for discovery and punishment with sanctions (severity, celerity and
certainty) is not significant. Therefore, H1 is proposed as:
Higher levels of information security policy enforcement results in increased information
security policy compliance.
The human element continues to be the top concern among security professionals
and top management teams, and employees are the weakest link (Tsohou et al., 2015).
Employee failure to comply with information security policies results in the opportunity
and provides sufficient rationalization, thereby promoting belief that fraud can be
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successfully perpetrated (Johnston et al., 2015; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; Richardson &
Director, 2008).
Many potential fraud events originate with an individual’s ability to download
sensitive information with little perceived monitoring or accountability. Quality security
policies allow only the minimum number of highly vetted employees access to sensitive
information based on a bona-fide job requirement and “need-to-know”. Often this first
line of defense is enough to prevent any further progress toward fraud. Policy quality
may offset neutralization in some employees when they perceive strong organizational
policy is also routinely enforced (Vance et al., 2013).
When institutional or individual pressure to comply with established policy is
perceived as low or insignificant, employees are more likely to attempt fraud. Policy
serves to shape employee beliefs regarding management’s dedication toward overall
information security (Tsohou et al., 2015). Higher quality policy spells out specific
expectations that employees must meet; deterrence and the threat of sanctions forces
conformance to these requirements and specifications (Crosby, 1979). When effectively
deployed, quality information security policies prohibit the unauthorized download of
sensitive and valuable proprietary information, including company trade secrets and
intellectual property.
Therefore, H2 is proposed as:
Higher levels of information security policy quality increases information security policy
compliance.
The strongest and most consistent predictor of actual information security policy
compliance is an individual’s intent to comply (Sommestad et al., 2014). Intent to comply
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is established through several variables. These include having a well-established, quality
standard for employees to compare with their daily actions and perceived benefits or
sanctions for compliance or non-compliance (deterrence effect).
Consistent with our other hypotheses that increased security policy quality and
enforcement individually result in increased compliance, we expect a greater effect when
testing the interaction between higher (lower) levels of policy quality and strong (weak)
enforcement of the policy. Research findings support that policy quality and enforcement
are significant factors in achieving information security policy compliance within
organizations (Goo et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). We hypothesize a significant effect
when the constructs of security policy quality and policy enforcement are implemented
simultaneously. This synergistic effect is consistent with previous studies where these
constructs explained significant variance when individually tested (Sommestad et al.,
2014).
General Deterrence Theory suggests that sanctions, disincentives and the threat of
various punishments (sanctions) will discourage potential fraudsters from attempting
prohibited behavior, thereby supporting policy compliance among employees (Straub &
Welke, 1998). When employees feel their supervisors and leadership place a strong
emphasis on security and lead by example, they are more likely to comply. When
supervisors include elements of security in employee performance appraisals, compliance
is increased (Goo et al., 2014).
Therefore, H3 is proposed as:
Higher levels of information security policy quality combined with effective enforcement
increases information security policy compliance.
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Incentives, opportunity, and rationalization are antecedents that increase the
potential for fraud (Accountants, 2002; Cressey, 1950, 1953). Noncompliance weakness
is a leading predictor of detrimental incidents, including fraud (Steinbart et al., 2015).
Based on current literature, we propose that information security compliance decreases
individual opportunity and rationalization, thereby resulting in corresponding decreases
in organizational fraud (Otero, 2015).
Computer abuse includes employee noncompliance with computer security
policies; fraud could be substantially reduced if employees would adhere to
organizational information security policies (Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin & Willison,
2009). This “insider threat” is so pervasive that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
announced implementation of a new regulation specifically to address the problem. The
policy requires organizations doing business with DoD to develop and implement
individual programs to detect, deter and mitigate potential insider threats (Tadjdeh,
2016).
A culture of compliance may develop when employees feel that understanding
and following established policy is desirable. Past research indicates that information
security policy design and implementation are important, and that poor quality results in
more security breaches (D'Arcy et al., 2014; Whitman, 2003). The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) clarified auditing standards in AU-C 240 in order
to improve auditor effectiveness by enabling them to better identify potential fraud based
on the Fraud Triangle. Many of the standards in AU-C 240 specifically address
opportunity and motivation and support the proposition that increased levels of policy
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enforcement reduces reported organizational fraud levels (Cressey, 1953; Roden et al.,
2016).
Information security internal controls serve to limit and reduce the incidence of
unethical behavior in organizations predicted by the Fraud Triangle by increasing
compliance (Accountants, 2002; Liu et al., 2015). Information technology controls
consist of two categories, general and application. General controls are comprehensive
and include restricting access, separation of duties based on need, and physical controls.
Application controls affect later modification of IT programs (Dickins & Reisch, 2012).
The degree of internal control compliance achieved affects the overall fraud levels
reported (Liu et al., 2015).
Empirical data supports the proposition that unauthorized access to data and
subsequent file transfers offer multiple opportunities to engage in fraud (Lynch &
Gomaa, 2003; Tabuena, 2013). Fraud perpetrators having access to valuable account
databases often change account values in order to conceal fraud and steal from clients
(Steinbart et al., 2015). Limiting access to information systems is one of the most basic
forms of control instituted through security policies to protect information resources.
Enforcing a policy effectively limiting the number of authorized users also limits the
potential for malevolent behaviors leading to fraud. For example, an employee scheming
to misappropriate a customer database must violate several policies in order to carry out
the fraud. If an employee lacks basic access privileges to the database, then there is no
fraud opportunity regardless of their incentive (pressure) and rationalization. Since
fraudulent activities are “deliberate and non-random”, there is a tendency for individuals
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who do not follow established policy to deviate in other areas of security enforcement
(Dilla & Raschke, 2015; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003).
Therefore, H4 is proposed as: Information security policy compliance is inversely
related to reported organizational fraud.

CHAPTER 3 METHODS
Participants
Data was obtained from a nationwide pool using Qualtrics respondents. The first
data set was solicited from various partners in industry whom we knew personally and
were willing to participate. This included a wide range of business interests and
industries. This initial data is used to perform a pilot survey and an Exploratory Factor
Analysis (EFA) for a reliability check of the proposed instrument and to validate the
scales (n=360) and derive a more parsimonious model. The second data set is used for the
main study (n=400).
Operationalization of the variables
A 7-point Likert Survey Scale was chosen as the appropriate method because the
focus of our study seeks individual (employee and management) attitudes and opinions
regarding attributes of selected policy characteristics. Survey instruments will assess
attitudes and perceptions from both the managerial and employee perspectives toward
organizational policy quality, policy enforcement, compliance, and organizational fraud.
Survey instruments were adapted using techniques specified by Mackenzie et al. (2011)
and Steinbart et al., (2016) (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011; Steinbart et al.,
2015). Constructs were developed using exacting definitions to capture key aspects of
policy security, enforcement, compliance and organizational fraud (MacKenzie et al.,
2011). Items were selected to fully represent each information security construct to
ensure that the concepts represented by each covary with the pilot test results.
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Independent Variables
Information security policy quality.
Information security policy quality is the perceived level of adequacy and
completeness of the guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an
organization (Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015; Goo et al., 2014). Policy quality is a
function of how complete and adequate the policy serves to cover all potential risk
situations in the organization (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Crosby, 1979). For example, high
quality policies require written, mandatory guidelines regarding acceptable parameters
for use of organizational computer resources.
The information security policy quality construct measures the extent to which
employees perceive that their company’s information security policy is comprehensive,
effective, protects sensitive information from disclosure, and protects employees and the
company from liability due to compromise. Twelve items were adapted from Chen,
Ramamurthy & Wen (2015). Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert scale:
1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree.
Information security policy enforcement.
The enforcement construct measures the extent to which employees perceive that
employees are aware of, trained to standard, and comply with various rules set forth in
the specific policy on a continuous basis. Seven items were adapted from Bulgurcu
(2010) to represent the construct). Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert scale:
1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree.
Information security policy compliance.
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Information security policy compliance consists of employee perceptions of the
degree to which employees actually conform with and abide by the established
organizational security policies. Seven items were initially adapted from Herath and Rao
(2010) to represent the construct. Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert scale:
1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree.
Dependent Variable – Organizational Fraud
The dependent variable is organizational fraud, which we define here from
Black’s Law Dictionary as “some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with
intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As
distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional” (Bryan, 2009).
Organizational frauds are generally classified into three primary categories: asset
misappropriations, corruption and financial statement fraud (ACFE, 2016).
The fraud construct measures the extent to which employees perceive that fraud is
possible in their company because of violations of organizational information security
policies (lack of compliance). Five items were adapted from Lynch and Gomaa (2003),
who performed studies of information technology and its impact on employee behavioral
attitudes in predicting computer fraud. Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert
scale: 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree.
Analysis
To analyze the data, we performed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression to
determine if employee perceptions of quality and enforcement are main effects and to
determine the extent of their interaction. OLS regression was selected since it minimizes
the residuals or differences between predicted and empirical values pertaining to the
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dependent variable (JFJ Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). We found significant
synergy and interaction effects between policy quality and enforcement as hypothesized.
Baker and Wallace (2015) found significant positive correlations between security policy
implementation, including enforcement, and lower violation outcomes. They also found
that organizations reporting higher quality and levels of technical control were more
likely to experience incidents than those with high scores across all three types of
controls. This study also supports that an incomplete security program, i.e., less
enforcement, is less effective than a more comprehensive program (Baker & Wallace,
2007). We are also testing to see if there is full or partial mediation between the
independent variables and the dependent variable by a potential mediating variable
(compliance).

CHAPTER 4 RESULTS
This chapter will provide data analysis and findings from the empirical study.
First, we discuss the pilot study and associated Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Next,
we evaluate the data for assumptions required for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression. We then test each hypothesis using OLS regression and analyze the model for
potential partial or full mediation. Finally, we provide findings and results for each of the
hypotheses tested.
Issues with the Survey Method
White noise and other potential issues have been discussed in the literature
regarding the use of online surveys to collect data (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001;
Hunter, 2012; Ravallion & Chen, 1997). Cognitive measurement error and “White Noise
Error” may be associated with survey questions that potentially affect the validity of
survey questions and ultimately the research’s outcome. Our Pilot Survey was designed
to assess and minimize the effects of white noise within our survey and the results.
Pilot Study and Data Collection
A pilot study was conducted prior to the main study using data from 360
respondents. The number of respondents chosen for the pilot study is based on the
minimum number of factor loadings needed for significance, in this case 350 (assuming a
minimum factor loading of 0.30). The pilot study was included to reduce measurement
error by validating the selected instrument’s effectiveness and the value of questions to
ensure the research questions are answered adequately (reliability and validity)
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(JFJ Hair et al., 2010). Any problems identified with the instrumentation or
elements of the data collection technique were corrected prior to the main study. All
respondents were employed by various companies nationally. Respondents had the ability
to choose from several categories including entry level/junior management/ supervisory,
mid-level management, senior-level management (COO, CIO, CFO, etc.), military or
academic as listed in Table 4. All respondents were required to use a computer as part of
their daily duties and to have a current mandatory information security policy (ISP). The
response rate was 63.56% for the pilot survey.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Pilot Study (N=360)
Age
Valid

Sex
Valid

18-30 Years
31-40 Years
41-50 Years
50+ Years
Total

Percent
16.1
28.1
21.4
34.4
100.0

Valid
Percent
16.1
28.1
21.4
34.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
16.1
44.2
65.6
100.0

258
102
360

71.7
28.3
100.0

71.7
28.3
100.0

71.7
100.0

51
87
60
162
360

14.2
24.2
16.7
45.0
100.0

14.2
24.2
16.7
45.0
100.0

14.2
38.3
55.0
100.0

80

22.2

22.2

22.2

Frequency
58
101
77
124
360

Male
Female
Total
Time employed by the Company
Valid Less than one year
1-3 Years
3-5 Years
More than 5 years
Total
Current Job Position
Valid Entry-Level/Junior
management or
supervisory
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Mid-Level
Management
Senior-Level
Management (COO,
CIO, CFO, etc.).
Military
Academic
Total

147

40.8

40.8

63.1

67

18.6

18.6

81.7

13
53
360

3.6
14.7
100.0

3.6
14.7
100.0

85.3
100.0

An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was performed using data from the pilot
study on the three independent variables: quality, enforcement, and compliance. A
separate EFA was run using the dependent variable (fraud) alone. The purpose was to
examine the relationships among the variables and to identify the factors with common
patterns in order to reduce the number of factors to the minimum number that will
explain the most variance (JFJ Hair et al., 2010; JF Hair, Money, Samouel, & Page,
2011).
The EFA included the original 26 independent variables using Principal
Components Analysis with Varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization (JFJ Hair et al.,
2010). Factors with eigenvalues of 1.0 and above were selected from the total variance
explained. This initial solution included several variables that had more than one
significant loading, i.e., loading on more than one component (PQ8, PQ9, PQ10, PQ11,
PQ12). An intermediate step of factor analysis is to reduce or eliminate the significant
cross-loadings so that only one significant loading remains for each row of the factor
matrix (JFJ Hair et al., 2010). These cross-loading variables were removed from the
initial list since they had dual loadings exceeding the threshold of 0.40. The threshold of
0.40 was chosen because factor loadings in the 0.30 to 0.40 range are the minimum for
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structure interpretation. Loadings of 0.50 and above are practically significant; and
loadings exceeding 0.70 are considered to represent a well-defined structure (JFJ Hair et
al., 2010). The next iteration was run after removal of the five significant cross-loading
variables. The next iteration resulted in removal of two more cross-loading variables
(PQ5, PQ7). The final run resulted in removal of PQ4 and PQ6, which were the final
remaining variables cross-loading at a significant level (0.40 and above). None of the
remaining independent variables cross-loaded at a significant level and were retained.
This resulted in 17 of the original 26 independent variables used for our regression as
listed below in Table 5.
Table 5
Cross-Loadings – Final Rotated Solution (EFA)
*Policy
Enforcement

*Policy
Quality

*Policy
Compliance

(PE)

(PQ)

(COMP)

E1

0.58

0.27

0.03

n/a

E2

0.66

0.32

-0.04

n/a

*Policy
Enforcement

E3

0.81

0.25

-0.04

n/a

E4

0.80

0.21

-0.07

n/a

(ENF)

E5

0.79

0.24

0.03

n/a

E6

0.92

-0.04

0.02

n/a

E7

0.92

0.04

0.05

n/a

PQ1

0.32

0.79

0.14

n/a

PQ2

0.22

0.86

-0.03

n/a

PQ3

0.34

0.71

0.01

n/a

Constructs

*Policy
Quality (PQ)

Question
Items

**FRAUD
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*Policy
Compliance
(COMP)

C1

0.23

0.01

0.81

n/a

C2

9.17

0.02

0.80

n/a

C3

0.12

0.01

0.84

n/a

C4

0.12

-0.01

0.89

n/a

C5

0.11

0.06

0.88

n/a

***C6
Rev
Coded

0.13

0.14

0.87

n/a

***C7
Rev
Coded

0.23

0.11

0.84

n/a

F1

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.69

F2

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.81

F3

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.80

F4

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.81

***F5
Rev
Coded

n/a

n/a

n/a

-0.40

**FRAUD

*First EFA using independent variables
**Second EFA using dependent variable, no Varimax rotation
***Three items were reverse-coded
These remaining variables were then used to compute new summated score variables for
each construct. These newly computed variables were then used for OLS regression to
test each of the hypotheses. Summated score variables are used to help reduce
measurement error and to achieve parsimony with the number of variables in the model
(JFJ Hair et al., 2010).

44

After analysis of the scales, three variables (C6, C7 & F5) were identified for
reverse coding. This was performed due to the variables being negatively coded, i.e.,
lower values indicated higher agreement or more positive sentiments (Krosnick, 1999).
A second EFA was performed to analyze the dependent variable (fraud). This was
performed separately since it is inappropriate to mix independent and dependent variables
in a single EFA and subsequently use the derived factors to support dependence
relationships (JF Hair et al., 2011). Since there was only one dependent variable, the
solution obtained was not Varimax rotated.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics (N=400)
Age
Frequency Percent
Valid 18-30 Years
104
26.0
31-40 Years
146
36.5
41-50 Years
76
19.0
50+ Years
74
18.5
Total
400
Sex
Valid Male
200
50.0
Female
200
50.0
Total
400
Time Employed
Valid Less than one year
40
10.0
1-3 Years
81
20.3
3-5 Years
85
21.3
More than 5 years
194
48.7
Total
400
Current Job Position
Valid Entry-Level/Junior
149
37.3
management or supervisory
Mid-Level Management
Senior-Level Management
(COO, CIO, CFO, etc.).
Military
Academic
Total
Collection and Analysis

160
56
2
33
400

Valid
Percent
26.0
36.5
19.0
18.5
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
26.0
62.5
81.5
100.0
100.0

50.0
50.0
100.0

50.0
100.0
100.0

10.0
20.3
21.3
48.7

10.0
30.3
51.3
100.0
100.0

37.3

37.3

40.0
14.0

40.0
14.0

77.3
91.3

5.0
8.3
100

.5
8.3
100.0

91.8
100.0
100.0

As in the pilot study, all respondents were employed by various companies
nationally. Respondents had the ability to choose from several categories including entry
level/junior management/ supervisory, mid-level management, senior-level management
(COO, CIO, CFO, etc.), military or academic as listed in Table 6. All respondents were
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required to use a computer as part of their daily duties and to have a current mandatory
information security policy (ISP). 400 respondents answered the survey questions
completely, with a response rate of 77.57%.
A test of internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) was performed with
each of the factors separately. This is to determine whether the items in each scale
combined into a single index captures in a consistent manner the respective constructs
being measured. The results are reflected below in Table 7. Cronbach’s Alpha should be
at least 0.70 (0.60 acceptable for exploratory). The overall Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.82
which is considered acceptable for our study.
Table 7
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Cronbach's Alpha Based on
Alpha
Standardized Items
*0.82
0.83

N of Items
22

*0.60 acceptable for exploratory research, 0.70 otherwise.
The KMO statistic measures sampling adequacy overall and for each individual
variable (Kaiser 1970; Cerny and Kaiser 1977; Dziuban & Shirkey, 1974). KMO values
greater than 0.8 are considered good and less than 0.5 must be remediated, possibly by
removing the values. Since the overall measure is 0.95, the sample is considered adequate
and statistically significant (p = 0.05). Each of the individual Measures of Sampling
Adequacy (MSA) produced on the Anti-Image Matrices (Appendix) range from 0.68 to
0.96 and are therefore all considered acceptable measures for our research (Table 8).
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Table 8
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy.
Bartlett's Test of
Approx. Chi-Square
Sphericity
df
Sig.

0.95
5138.219
325
.000

Evaluation for Assumptions of Regression Analysis
We evaluated the regression model for assumptions of linearity,
homoscedasticity, independence of the residuals, and normality (JFJ Hair et al., 2010).
First, we performed Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances with the results
indicated in Table 9 and found no significant difference in the error variance across
groups (0.67, p = 0.05).
Table 9
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
Dependent Variable: FRAUD
F
df1
df2
p
Sig.
0.90
379
20
0.05
0.67
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across
groups.
a. Design: Intercept + QUALITY + ENFORCEMENT + COMPLIANCE
We then performed an initial check for normality of the error term of the variate
by visually examining the normal probability plots of the residuals. The values fall
generally along the diagonal line with no substantial or significant departures, meaning
that the residuals may represent a normal distribution and the variate meets the
assumption of normality (JFJ Hair et al., 2010). A visual inspection of their histograms,
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normal Q-Q plots, and box plots demonstrated that the data were approximately normally
distributed. In Table 10 we analyzed the standardized residuals for kurtosis and skewness.
The z-values were computed by dividing the skewness and kurtosis statistic by the
standard error, resulting in z = -1.139 for skewness and z = 1.687, respectively (Cramer
& Howitt, 2004; Doane & Seward, 2011). Both of the computed z-values fall within the
range of -1.96 to 1.96. Based on these results, our data does not differ significantly from
normality. From this we conclude that our data are approximately normally distributed in
terms of skewness and kurtosis.
Table 10
Descriptives for Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable-Fraud)
Standardized
Residual for
FRAUD

Statistic
Std. Error
Mean
0.00
0.04
95% Confidence
Lower Bound
0.00
Interval for Mean
Upper Bound
0.08
5% Trimmed Mean
0.00
Median
0.00
Variance
0.69
Std. Deviation
0.84
Minimum
-3.15
Maximum
2.24
Range
5.38
Interquartile Range
0.96
*Skewness
-0.14
0.12
*Kurtosis
0.41
0.24
Kurtosis z-score
-1.14
Skewness z-score
1.69
*Values within -1.96 to 1.96 support conclusion of normally distributed data
Table 11 lists the Cronbach’s Alpha, composite reliability (where provided) and Average
Variance Extracted (AVE) for instruments used in past research. Although our values are
not quite as high as the constructs previously used, they are well within the acceptable
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limits for our research. The fraud construct has not been used as extensively so no data
was given for reliability in previous research.
Table 11
Cronbach’s Alpha, CFR and AVE for Constructs
Construct

Definition

Cronbach’s
Alpha
0.92
(composite)

CFR
n/r

Cronbach’s
Current Study
0.90
0.77

AVE

Information
Security
Policy
Enforcement

The level of supervisory
oversight, monitoring and
organizational emphasis placed
on information security
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, &
Benbasat, 2010).

Information
Security
Policy
Quality

The perceived level of adequacy
and completeness of the
guidelines that cover all
information risk possibilities in
an organization (Chen
Ramamurthy & Wen, 2015).

0.79

0.80

0.68

0 .79

Information
Security
Policy
Compliance

The degree to which employees
actually adhere to rules set forth
in the specific policy established
by the company (Herath & Rao,
2009).

0.92

n/r

0.87

0.88

Fraud

Some deceitful practice or
willful device resorted to with
intent to deprive another of his
right, or in some manner to do
him an injury. As distinguished
from negligence, it is always
positive, intentional (Black’s
Law Dictionary, 2016; Lynch &
Gomaa, 2003).

0.78

n/a

n/a

0.75
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Regression Model
The initial regression model was stated as: Predicted compliance Y = bo + v1 + v2 + v3 + e
Where:
bo = constant rate of compliance.
v1 = change in compliance associated with change in policy enforcement
v2 = change in compliance associated with change in policy quality
V3 = (v1*v2) change in compliance associated with interaction of quality and enforcement
e = Prediction error (residual)
A simple linear regression was run to evaluate if the enforcement construct
predicts compliance, B = 0.73, p = 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation
was found, F (1, 398) = 290.75, p = 0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.53. The model indicates
a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable (policy
enforcement) and compliance (p = 0.05). The Pearson Correlation (Table 12) is 0.74,
indicating a significant correlation between enforcement and compliance. Policy
enforcement is a significant predictor of compliance. This supports our first hypothesis
(H1) that higher levels of information security policy enforcement results in increased
information security policy compliance.
Next, a simple linear regression was run to evaluate if the quality construct
predicts compliance, B = 0.55, p = 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation
was found, F (1, 398) = 114.09, p = 0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.30. The model indicates
a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable (policy quality)
and compliance (p = 0.05). The Pearson Correlation (Table 12) is 0.54, indicating a
significant correlation between quality and compliance. Policy quality is a significant
predictor of compliance. This supports our second hypothesis (H2) that higher levels of
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information security policy quality results in increased information security policy
compliance.
Next, a simple linear regression was run to evaluate the relationship and potential
significant interaction effect between quality and enforcement on compliance, B = 0.71, p
= 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation was found, F (1, 398) = 265.41, p =
0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.51. The model indicates a statistically significant
relationship between the independent variable (interaction effect between policy quality
and enforcement) and compliance (p = 0.05). This interaction effect is a significant
predictor of compliance. This supports our third hypothesis (H3) that higher levels of
information security policy quality combined with increased enforcement results in
increased information security policy compliance.
A simple linear regression was run to evaluate if the compliance construct
predicts fraud, B = -0.61, p = 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation was
found, F (1, 398) = 27.36, p = 0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.28 The model indicates a
statistically significant negative relationship between the independent variable
(compliance) and fraud, p = 0.05. The Pearson Correlation (Table 12) is -0.530,
indicating a significant negative correlation between compliance and fraud. Therefore,
our fourth hypothesis (H4) that higher levels of information security policy compliance
results in decreased organizational fraud is supported.
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Table 12
Regression Results
Variable
Coefficient
ENF-COMP
0.73
QUAL-COMP
0.55
INTERACT_QUAL_ENF
0.71
COMP-FRAUD
-0.61

Std.
Error
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.443

tstat
17.05
10.68
16.29
-6.739

p- Adj.
F2
value
R
Statistic
0.00 0.53
290.75
0.00 0.30
114.09
0.00 0.51
265.41
0.00 0.28
27.36

Table 13
Correlation Matrix
Pearson Correlation FRAUD
COMP
ENF
QUAL
Sig. (1-tailed)

FRAUD COMP ENF QUAL
1.00
-0.53 -0.36 -0.23
-0.53
-0.36
-0.23

1.00
0.74
0.54

0.74 0.54
1.00 0.56
0.56 1.00

FRAUD_ .
COMP
0.00

0.00
.

0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00

ENF
QUAL

0.00
0.00

.
0.00
0.00 .

0.00
0.00

A summary of regression results and hypotheses is contained in Table 14. H1, H2 and H3
and H4 were supported. Full mediation was also supported.
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Table 14
Summary of Regression Results
Construct

Definition

H1

Higher levels of information
security policy enforcement results
in increased information security
policy compliance.

H2

Higher levels of information
security policy quality increases
information security policy
compliance.

H3

H4

Mediation

Higher levels of information
security policy quality combined
with effective enforcement
increases information security
policy compliance.
Information security policy
compliance is inversely related to
reported organizational fraud.

Supported or
NonSupported
Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Full Mediation

Supported

Partial Mediation

Not Supported

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTRIBUTION
This chapter begins with a discussion of the limitations we experienced in
conducting our research. We then discuss both the academic and practitioner
contributions derived from the research and how it may be used in industry. Next, we
discuss future potential research related to information security policy characteristics.
Finally, we finish with our conclusions from the research.
Limitations
Empirical data has historically been difficult to obtain in fraud research as
respondents are consistently hesitant to report based on fears of compromise and
attribution (Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2018). We experienced this phenomenon to be
true in our study. However, we were able to somewhat overcome this problem using
Qualtrics survey data, which provided an anonymous platform to gather information from
respondents who are currently in the workforce. This anonymity served to assuage the
respondents inherent fear of attribution, traceability and perceived ramifications
potentially resulting from participating in our survey.
We discovered some potential shortcoming of using this anonymous data. Among
these were the lack of face-to-face interaction with potential respondents and the ability
to glean additional insights beyond the scope of the designed study. For example, face-toface contact using open-ended questions would allow respondents to volunteer additional
information that could lead to further studies and research avenues. However, based on
54
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our initial pilot test of the survey instruments, we were able to validate the instruments
and then obtain sufficient data to complete the study. Also, we were not able to analyze
and compare the different levels of information security policy quality by actually
viewing and rating various organizational policies as we had originally planned.
Another potential limitation is the respondents’ lack of vesting and accountability
for the outcomes obtained as a result of the answers provided. Since we could not capture
specific relationships between the respondents’ answer and specific organizations, the
data has less overall meaning than if we could pair the results with specific companies,
their level of supervisory and managerial security competence, and other variables.
Academic Contribution
There is a shortage of articles related to fraud examination especially as it relates
to information systems (Brody, Melendy, & Perri, 2012; G. M. Trompeter et al., 2014).
Originally, we set out to provide a unique contribution to the field of fraud study by
examining an innovative and unprecedented insight into how the many characteristics of
information security policy influences organizational fraud. Our contribution is a modest
beginning to exploring additional ways of solving the growing fraud problem in
organizations.
A significant finding of this research is that policy compliance reduces
organizational fraud. We also found that compliance fully mediates between the
independent variables of policy quality and enforcement with fraud. This has practical
relevance indicating that more research is needed to determine potential links between
fraud and other information security policy characteristics, such as more focus on specific
business units. For example, policies that are tailored and provide a much narrower focus
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on specific business units may serve to provide the differentiation need to identify and
track potential abuses. This is also consistent with past research that the most significant
threat from fraud and systems compromise is carried out by trusted insiders (Bulgurcu,
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010a).
Practitioner Contribution
Potential solutions to fraud are increasingly valuable to boards, management, and
organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit. Empirical data is consistent in finding
that trusted individuals within the organization are the most likely to violate existing
policies and engage in fraudulent activity. The trusted insider is more significant than any
known external threats. Focus on the human element within organizations continues to be
a top priority and finding improved solutions to the insider threat may be enhanced by
closer examination of information security policy characteristics combined with other
analytical tools.
Our research could provide significant insight into compliance with the new
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) by examination in further detail those
aspects of security policy characteristics identified (Desai, 2013; Diker Vanberg &
Maunick, 2018; Tikkinen-Piri, Rohunen, & Markkula, 2017). Our research indicates that
the human element is very important in reducing malicious activities by trusted insiders.
The GDPR is “common sense” data security which is directed at controlling the insider
threat. It minimizes collection of private personal data and requires that personal data no
longer needed must be deleted. It also restricts data access through enforcement of
policies, procedures, and processes. Unlike many other security programs, GDPR targets
the human side of security, including enforcement and compliance issues. GDPR applies
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to all organizations storing and/or processing EU resident’s personal data, regardless of
the geographic location. Many organizations are unaware that the EU GDPR regulation
apply globally. The impact to businesses is comprehensive and will permanently change
the way customer data is collected, stored, and used. Organizations offering goods or
services to EU residents must comply with GDPR requirements. There are many
mandatory policy compliance features in the regulation where our research could be
applied, including opt-in consent, data storage and transfer, and many others.
Theoretical Contribution
Our study contributes to General Deterrence Theory (Bridges & Stone, 1986;
Maxwell & Gray, 2000) by supporting the premise that sanctions, disincentives and the
threat of punishment and/or sanctions serve to discourage potential violators from
performing prohibited behavior. Our research supports that the perceived probability of
discovery coupled with the severity of the potential advertised sanctions or punishment
increases compliance, while the level of prohibited activity declines in a corresponding
manner as posited by Straub (Straub & Welke, 1998). Stronger internal controls, better
quality policies and more robust policy enforcement serves to deter unethical behavior.
Stronger controls may correspondingly reduce the incidence of fraud, especially with
enhanced internal monitoring of trusted employees.
Future Research
Our research opens the door to other potential behavioral research areas that are
just beginning to be explored. For example, information security policy characteristics
could be examined in the context of solo versus collusive frauds and the degree to which
these internal controls could serve to reduce anonymity and therefore potential fraud
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activities (Bishop, Hermanson, & Riley Jr, 2017). Research that studies specific
behaviors of employees when they have greater input into the design and implementation
of information security policy would also be a possibility.
Conclusion
As a result of this research, we can conclude that there are significant
relationships between certain information security policy characteristics and the degree to
which they are enforced. Enforcement may be enhanced if policies are more
comprehensive and tailored to the specific duty or function of the employee. The
synergistic effect of higher quality policies coupled with increased enforcement may
enhance overall compliance. Potential links between compliance and organizational fraud
still warrants further study.
The just-released AFCE Report to the Nations indicates that fraud is continuing to
increase globally, both in scope and scale. As such, it is imperative that academia,
government and business exhaust all efforts to glean effective deterrents and solutions to
the problem. Our research is a significant first-step to analyze these relationships since
they have not been studied significantly in the past. Gauging from the interest generated
from our research, we are confident that this will open up further opportunities to explore
possible links between information security policy characteristics and fraud.
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APPENDIX 1
EMPLOYEE MEASUREMENT ITEMS AND SCALES
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All items use 7-point Likert scales: 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree
Neither
Strongly
Somewhat
Disagree
agree nor Somewhat
disagree
disagree
Agree (6)
(2)
disagree
agree (5)
(1)
(3)
(4)

Strongly
agree (7)

* Denotes survey questions used as a result of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).
Fraud Survey - Qualtrics Respondents
Are you currently working full time? Yes or No.
Skip To: End of Block If Working = No

Do you use a computer for work? Yes or No.
Skip To: End of Block If Work = No

Please complete the following demographic questions. This is very important for us to be
able to draw conclusions from the data. Answering these questions will not link your
answer to any individual data.
Sex: Male or Female.
Time employed by the company:
Less than one year
1-3 Years
3-5 Years
More than 5 years
The approximate number of personnel employed by my company is:
_______________________________________________________________
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My current age as of today is:
18-30 Years
31-40 Years
41-50 Years
50+ Years
My current job position is classified as:
Entry-Level/Junior management or supervisory
Mid-Level Management
Senior-Level Management (COO, CIO, CFO, etc.).
Military
Academic

KSU IRB Study #18-021: INVESTIGATING INFORMATION SECURITY
POLICY CHARACTERISTICS: DO QUALITY, ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE REDUCE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAUD?
Thank you very
much for assisting with this research!
Title of Research Study: Investigating information security policy characteristics: Do
quality, enforcement, and compliance reduce organizational fraud?
Researcher's Contact Information: Name, Telephone, and Email. Dennis Brown,
678-557-9844. DBrown3@kennesaw.edu.
Introduction: You are being invited to take part in a research study conducted by Dennis
Brown of Kennesaw State University. Before you decide to participate in this study, you
should read this form and ask questions about anything that you do not understand. This
is an academic study for purposes of partial fulfillment of requirements for the Doctorate
of Business Administration (DBA) at Kennesaw State University.
Description of Project
The purpose of the study is to gain insight into potential effect(s) of information
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security policy quality and enforcement on policy compliance. Ultimately, we hope to
determine potential impacts of policy compliance on organizational fraud.
Explanation of Procedures
You will be asked to complete online a series of questions relating to your job position.
Please answer each question honestly and to the best of your ability. It is important to
answer all questions, but you may stop answering at any time.
Time Required
The entire questionnaire should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete.
Risks or Discomforts: There are no known risks or anticipated discomforts in this
study.
Benefits: Although there are no direct benefits to you for answering the survey questions,
you may learn more about yourself and about the topic of fraud and information security
policies. Your responses will also help further research in this important and emerging
field.
Compensation: Compensation will be offered via your panel membership.
Confidentiality: The results of this participation will be anonymous. Data will not be
linked to any individual initially or at any stage of the survey. All data will be aggregated
and statistically tested for overall results. IP addresses will not be collected at any time.
Inclusion Criteria for Participation: You must be 18 years of age or older to participate
in this study.
Use of Online Survey: IP addresses will NOT be collected. Since there is no need to
correlate individual responses with aggregate data, participant responses will be
anonymous and not linked to any individual.
Research at Kennesaw State University
that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional
Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to
the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403,
Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268 or via e-mail at
IRB@kennesaw.edu.
PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS CONSENT DOCUMENT
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FOR YOUR RECORDS, OR IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PRINT CAPABILITIES, YOU
MAY CONTACT THE RESEARCHER TO OBTAIN A COPY
I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I understand that
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without
penalty.
I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions.
Considering your current position, please rate the extent that you agree or disagree with
the following statements below?
Policy Quality (PQ)
*PQ1 My company provides all employees mandatory policies regarding computer usage
and proprietary data usage.
*PQ2 My company's written security policy clearly states that employees should only use
computer resources (and access data) for job-specific duties.
*PQ3 My company's written policies clearly state what computer resources employees
should have access to complete their job duties.
PQ4 My company's written policies specifically forbid employees from accessing
computer resources and data that they are not authorized to use in their job
responsibilities.
PQ5 My company has a clearly written information security policy that is easy to
understand and comply with.
PQ6 My company's Information security policy probably meets internationally
recognized technical benchmarks.
PQ7 My company's information security policy informs employees that all use of
computer resources will be logged and potentially monitored.
PQ8 My company's information security policy includes a clear and consistent definition
of boundaries regarding proper (and improper) employee use of computing assets.
PQ9 My company's information security policy ensures protection and security of
sensitive company information.
PQ10 My company's information security policy clearly sets forth disciplinary action and
sanctions for policy violations and disclosure.
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PQ11 My company's information security policy is comprehensive (covers all important
topics of computer and data risk).
PQ12 My company's information security policy is tailored to the different functional
areas specific to each business unit.
Enforcement (ENF)
*E1 If an employee were caught violating organizational information security policies,
they would be severely punished.
*E2 My company's whistleblower” program is reliable and actively monitored.
*E3 My company actively disciplines employees who break information security policies
and rules.
*E4 My company quickly investigates suspected information security policy infractions
and always holds employees accountable for violations.
*E5 My supervisor and management are focused on making sure that everyone follows
established information security policies and procedures.
*E6 The supervisors and leaders in my organization lead by example in information
security policy enforcement.
*E7 My fellow employees are active in information security policy enforcement
activities.
Compliance (COMP)
*C1 My company encourages all employees to lead by example to encourage compliance
with computer/data use and Information security policies.
*C2 All employees of my company intend to actively protect data and technology
resources. (according to the policies)
*C3 I perceive that all employees carry out prescribed information security policies of
my company.
*C4 All employees understand the importance of following prescribed information
security policy responsibilities at work, which creates a strong culture to meet established
standards for computer resources and Information security.
* C5 All employees view meeting established information security policy and computer
use as an integral part of their job.
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*C6 Employees in my company visit prohibited, non-work related sites (ESPN,
Facebook, etc.) even though this may increase the risk to company information system
*C7 Employees in my company play games using online social networks knowing this
may compromise company data.
Fraud (FRAUD)
*F1 I am aware of employees of my company using computer resources for personal
gain.
*F2 Stealing valuable assets from my employer using the company’s computer system
would be easy for a manager to accomplish.
*F3 Engaging in fraudulent behavior using my company’s computer system would be
something that most managers would consider.
*F4 Managers are more likely to engage in fraudulent behavior using my company’s
computer system if they feel their activities are anonymous.
*F5 Most managers would never engage in fraudulent behavior using our computer
systems since they are loyal to the company and stakeholders.

APPENDIX 2
MEDIATION ASSESSMENT
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Mediation Assessment
Baron and Kenny (2006) posit that certain tests must be met in order for
mediation to be supported. Mediation tests the conditions that 1) the proposed mediator is
statistically significant with the independent variables; 2) that the proposed mediator is
statistically significant with the dependent variable; and that 3) when the dependent
variable is regressed on the proposed mediator and the independent variables, the
mediator must be statistically significant. All of these conditions must be present to
support a full mediation model (Baron & Kenny, 1986; P. J.-H. Hu, Hu, & Fang, 2017;
Zhao, Lynch Jr, & Chen, 2010). Here we test to see if policy compliance either fully or
partially mediates between the independent variables, (policy quality and policy
enforcement) and the dependent variable, fraud.
Predicted Fraud Incidence Y = bo + b1v1 + b2v2 + b3v3 +b4v4+e
Where:
bo = constant rate of fraud incidence independent of policy quality, enforcement, and
compliance.
v1 = change in fraud incidence associated with change in policy enforcement
v2 = change in fraud incidence associated with change in policy quality
v3 = change in fraud incidence associated with change in policy compliance
v4 = change in fraud incidence associated with interaction of quality and enforcement
e = Prediction error (residual)
We calculated an initial multiple regression of quality and enforcement on compliance, B
= 0.61 (enforcement) and 0.22 (quality), p = 0.05, (Table 15). A significant regression
equation was found, F (1, 398) = 165.52, p = 0.05 with adjusted R2 of 0.56. The model
produces a statistically significant relationship between the independent variables (policy
quality and enforcement) and the potential mediator (compliance). This satisfies the first
condition to support a finding of mediation.
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Table 15
Regression Results for Quality & Enforcement on Policy Compliance
(COMP)
Variable
ENF
QUAL

Coefficient
0.61
0.22

Std. Error
0.05
0.06

t-stat
12.28
4.41

Fp-value Adj. R
Statistic
0.00
0.56
165.52
0.00
0.56
165.52
2

Next, we calculated a regression of fraud on the potential mediator (compliance),
B = -0.53, p = 0.05, (Table 16). A significant regression equation was found, F (1, 398) =
80.56, p = 0.05 with adjusted R2 of 0.28. The model produces a meaningful adjusted R2
and a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable (fraud) and the
potential mediator (compliance). This satisfies the second condition to support a finding
of mediation.
Table 16
Regression Results for Fraud and Compliance (COMP)
Coefficient
Std. Error t-stat
p-value Adj. R2 F-Statistic
Variable
COMP
-0.53
0.29 -8.97
0.00
0.28
80.56
Finally, we calculated a regression of fraud on the mediator (compliance), B = 0.60; quality, B = 0.07; and enforcement, B = 0.05, p = 0.05, (Table 17). A significant
regression equation was found, F (3, 396) = 27.36, p = 0.05 with adjusted R2 of 0.28. The
model produces a meaningful adjusted R2 and a statistically significant relationship
between the dependent variable (fraud) and the potential mediator (compliance).
Enforcement and quality are not significant. This satisfies the third and final condition to
support a finding of mediation. Therefore, compliance fully mediates the relationship
between the independent variables (quality and enforcement) and fraud.
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Table 17
Regression Results for Quality, Enforcement & Compliance (COMP)- Fraud
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-stat
p-value Adj. R2 F-Statistic
ENF
0.05
0.57
0.56
0.58
0.28
27.36
QUAL
0.07
0.36
0.95
0.34
0.28
27.36
COMP
-0.60
0.44
-6.74
0.00
0.28
27.36

